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THE SHIFTING FOUNDATIONS OF
FINANCIAL REGULATION
PAUL SCHULTZ
UNIVERSITY OF NOTRE DAME
MENDOZA COLLEGE OF BUSINESS
INTRODUCTION
Financial regulation in the U.S. and around the world has changed
dramatically since the 2007-2008 financial crisis. There are many visible
manifestations of the changes, including Dodd-Frank, Basel III and, other
laws. In this paper, I will discuss what I believe are two important recent
changes in our approach to financial regulation and how they are reflected
in recent laws and in new regulatory authorities. This article will discuss
both of these changes broadly, but will also focus on how they are reflected
in regulation by the new Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB).
The first change is an increasing reliance on regulator judgment and
discretion rather than on hard and specific rules and regulations. Hard rules
are not disappearing from current regulation; for example, Basel III capital
requirements and the definition of qualified mortgages are hard rules. But
recent financial regulation does grant extraordinary discretionary powers to
regulators.
The second change is an increasing reliance on behavioral economics to
motivate and justify regulation. Traditional motivations for financial
regulation have relied on market failure. Behavioral economics suggests
that individuals’ inability to make rational and intelligent choices makes
paternalistic financial regulation desirable.
THE SHIFT TOWARD INCREASED REGULATOR DISCRETION
Hard Rules Versus Discretion
Hard rules are unambiguous rules about what a financial institution or
market participant must do or cannot do. Both regulators and financial
institutions know about these rules before actions are taken and know what
the institution must do to be in compliance. For example, under Basel III, if
a bank holds sovereign debt from a country with a country risk
1
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classification of 4-6, the risk-weighing factor for the debt is 8%. This tells
both the bank and regulator exactly how much equity capital a bank must
hold against sovereign debt with this level of risk. There is no ambiguity,
and the regulatory requirement is known in advance.
As another example, insiders are defined as a company’s officers,
directors, and owners of more than 10% of the company’s stock.1 Any sale
of stock by an insider must be reported to the SEC within two business days
of the sale. Who qualifies as an insider and what they must do when they
sell stock is clear in advance.2
Recently, we have seen a move away from hard rules and toward more
regulator discretion. Rather than using hard and fast rules that are known in
advance, regulators are making decisions based on broad regulatory goals
and their individual judgment. This is not to say rules are not being written
and enforced—far from it—but regulator discretion seems to be becoming
more important.
One familiar example is in the designation of non-banks as
Systemically Important Financial Institutions (SIFIs). SIFIs are institutions
whose failure could threaten the financial stability of the United States.
Companies designated as non-bank SIFIs include AIG, General Electric
Capital, Prudential Financial, and MetLife.3 A SIFI designation means the
company comes under the supervision of the Federal Reserve, is subject to
capital requirements, needs to make regular living wills, and may be subject
to the Volcker rule.4 It is a big deal, and companies like Blackrock and
Fidelity Investments have made great efforts to avoid being named nonbank SIFIs.
The Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC) determines whether
or not an institution is a SIFI. They do not have specific rules or metrics to
determine non-bank SIFIs. In response to calls for more transparency in the
designation process, the FSOC has said,
Due to the unique threat that each nonbank financial company may
pose to U.S. financial stability and the qualitative nature of the
inquiry under the statutory considerations, it is not possible to
provide broadly applicable metrics defining these channels or to
identify universally applicable links between the channels and the
statutory considerations.5
1. U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Forms 3, 4, 5, FAST ANSWERS (Jan. 15, 2013),
https://www.sec.gov/answers/form345.htm.
2. Id.
3. U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, DESIGNATIONS, FIN. STABILITY OVERSIGHT COUNCIL
(2015), https://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/fsoc/designations/Pages/default.aspx#nonbank .
4. DELOITTE, SIFI DESIGNATION AND ITS POTENTIAL IMPACT ON NONBANK FINANCIAL
COMPANIES 8-10 (2013).
5. Financial Stability Oversight Council, 77 FED. REG. 70, 21641 (April 11, 2012) (to be
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In other words, we cannot define a SIFI, but we know one when we see
it.
A second well-known and important example of regulator discretion is
the design of bank stress tests. Dodd-Frank calls for forward-looking stress
tests for large banks. These tests are simulations of unlikely but plausible
macroeconomic situations. To pass a stress test, a bank needs to maintain
minimum capital levels in the simulation. Failure to pass a stress test has
serious consequences.6 The bank will probably have to cut back or even
eliminate its dividend to increase its capital. News that a bank has failed a
stress test, as Citigroup or Zion’s Bancorp did in 2014, is usually
accompanied by a significant decline in the bank’s stock price.
Regulator discretion comes into play in the design of the stress test.
Banks are not given information on the simulated macroeconomic situation
in advance. They cannot make changes to their balance sheets to help pass
the stress test.
I believe that there are two reasons why we are moving toward more
regulator discretion and away from hard rules. The first is that financial
markets and institutions are much more complex than they were just a few
years ago, and financial innovation is taking place at a more rapid rate.
Complexity and change makes it more difficult to write widely applicable
rules.
The second reason for the increased reliance on regulator discretion is
political. The Federal Reserve, the SEC, the Comptroller of the Currency,
and other regulators avoided blame for the financial crisis by claiming that
they either lacked information or lacked authority to prevent the crisis.7 The
formation of FSOC is intended to make sure regulators have information
about the financial system as a whole.8 Greater discretion is intended to
make sure they have the authority to prevent a crisis.
Advantages of Regulator Discretion Over Hard and Specific Rules
There are advantages and disadvantages of depending on regulator
discretion rather than hard rules. One of the advantages of regulator
discretion is that rules can be gamed. A bank holding company with
consolidated assets in excess of $50 billion is deemed a SIFI and is subject
to more stringent regulatory standards and requirements than smaller
codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 1310).
6. Peter Eavis, What to Know About Bank Stress Tests, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 4, 2015),
http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2015/03/04/business/dealbook/05db-stress.html?_r=0.
7. U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, ABOUT FSOC (2015),
https://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/fsoc/about/Pages/default.aspx.
8. Melissa A. Z. Knoll, The Role of Behavioral Economics and Behavioral Decision
Making in Americans’ Retirement Savings Decisions, 70 SOCIAL SECURITY BULLETIN 4, 1 (2010)
available at https://www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/ssb/v70n4/v70n4p1.html.
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banks.9 Banks can get around a hard rule like this by selling assets, and
accountants can do many, many things to reduce the value of their
consolidated assets below $50 billion. The hard rule can be gamed. On the
other hand, regulators can simply designate a non-bank financial institution
as a SIFI. Accounting tricks can’t be used to avoid the designation.
A second advantage of regulator discretion rather than specific rules is
that innovation and technological change can be used to eventually
circumvent rules. ATMs for example, can be thought of as a technological
innovation that makes banking services more convenient for customers.
While ATMs do indeed do that, they were also a way to circumvent
restrictions on bank branch offices. More recently, Dodd-Frank’s new
margin requirements on swaps have been circumvented through
“futurization.” That is, much of the swap trading has migrated to futures on
swaps—an economically equivalent derivative contract with lower margin
requirements.10 This cycle of financial regulation, innovation, and
reregulation is termed the regulatory dialectic by Edward Kane.11 Regulator
discretion can adapt to financial innovation quickly, while rules are
rewritten with a much longer time lag.
Finally, an advantage of discretion is that, broadly speaking, rules are
based on a subset of the information available to the regulator. They do not
incorporate any special considerations that may apply in a particular case.
They do not incorporate innovation that has occurred since the rule writing.
Problems with Regulator Discretion
There are also significant problems with giving regulators too much
discretionary power. One is that an absence of specific hard-and-fast rules
creates uncertainty. For example, banks that are subjected to annual stress
tests by the Federal Reserve do not know the nature of the stress tests
beforehand. This eliminates banks’ ability to game the tests, but also creates
uncertainty. Will they pass? Can they afford to pay a dividend? Can they
afford to make an acquisition that will expose them to more risk from Asian
markets? This uncertainty can affect banks’ business decisions in the weeks
and months leading up to the stress tests.12
Another example of uncertainty is in the designation of SIFIs. Because
it relies on regulator discretion, financial institutions cannot game SIFI

9. The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Section 165 (a)(1) of
H.R. 4173.
10. JOE RENNISON, Swaps vs futures: OTC market speaks out, Risk (April 3, 2013),
http://www.risk.net/risk-magazine/feature/2255770/swaps-vs-futures.
11. Edward J. Kane, Interaction of Financial and Regulatory Innovation, 78 AM. ECON.
REV. 328, 331-33 (1988).
12. John Hartley, Fed Should Stop the Stress Test Guessing Game, AM. BANKER (March
13,2015), http://www.americanbanker.com/bankthink/fed-should-stop-the-stress-test-guessinggame.
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designation. At the same time though, they do not have clear guidance on
how to avoid being named a SIFI. Firms may make costly and unnecessary
or unsuccessful changes to their businesses in an effort to avoid a SIFI
designation.
A second problem with relying on regulator discretion is that
regulators’ intelligence and judgment, and the information that is available
to them, is limited. The financial system is very complicated, too
complicated for any individual to understand completely. It is naïve to
expect regulators to be able to foresee and prevent all future financial crises.
They’re not that smart. Nobody is. Giving more discretion to regulators can
give a false sense of security.
In retrospect, it is easy to see that mortgage-backed securities were
overpriced in 2008, and that financial firms that held large quantities of
them were at risk of failure. Had this been apparent at the time, smart
investors, say hedge fund managers, could have made many millions of
dollars betting against mortgage-backed securities. But they did not.
Richard Fuld, former CEO of Lehman Brothers bet big on mortgage-backed
securities through Lehman and personally lost almost $1 billion.13 Are
regulators really smarter than the people on Wall Street that lost money
during the financial crisis?
Perhaps the biggest problem with relying on regulator discretion rather
than hard rules is that it makes it easier for regulators to pursue their own
self-interest. Giving regulators discretion gives them power. Most use it
benignly in what they perceive to be the public interest. However, some just
enjoy wielding power. Alternatively, they can use it to generate publicity
for themselves to jumpstart a political career. They could do this, for
example, through high profile enforcements against unpopular financial
institutions. Or, regulators could use their discretionary powers to extract
perks or favors from the financial industry, including lucrative jobs in the
private sector after their regulatory career ends. The financial sector has no
incentive to curry favor with bureaucratic regulators who merely check
boxes that rules are met. It is the regulator’s discretion that makes
businesses attempt to influence him or her.
Finally, more regulatory discretion means more lobbying and more
meetings with regulators and politicians. Before rules are written, financial
firms typically meet with regulators to inform them about the likely impact
of rules and about alternative measures that could satisfy the regulators’
objectives. These activities are costly for both regulators and regulated
firms. After a rule is written though, the lobbying and meetings are done.
When regulators have discretion, the meetings never end.

13. Steve Fishman, Burning Down His House, N. Y. MAG. (Nov. 30, 2008),
http://nymag.com/news/business/52630.
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BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS AND CHANGING REGULATORY OBJECTIVES
The Approaches of Traditional and Behavioral Economics Toward
Regulation
The second change in our approach to financial regulation is, I believe,
a result of the increasing acceptance of behavioral economics. Traditional
economic theory assumes individuals are rational. Economists, of course,
know that people are not always rational, but rationality is a good
approximation and markets push people toward rational choices. The
assumption of rationality allows economists to produce useful models of
markets and economic behavior that yield clear predictions.
The traditional economic rationale for financial regulation is to remedy
market failures. A familiar example is bank runs. Banks get funds from
checking and saving accounts that can be withdrawn at any time. They
invest in mortgages and other illiquid long-term assets. Suppose that
depositors believe a bank is sound but fear that other depositors think it is
insolvent. Depositors have an incentive to withdraw money before others. If
they wait, the bank may not have cash and may not be able to give them
their money until they sell mortgages. If the bank has to sell its illiquid
assets quickly, it may not be able to get the full value for them. Depositors
may only receive a portion of their money back. So, a perfectly safe, solvent
bank can be driven out of business by a bank run.
This market failure is resolved by FDIC insurance. When depositors
know their accounts are fully insured, the incentives for bank runs
disappear. This market distortion creates other problems though, which
require additional regulations. With deposit insurance, banks can borrow
cheaply regardless of how many risks they take in their mortgages and other
investments. This heads-we-win, tails-the-FDIC-loses situation creates an
incentive for banks to take inappropriate risks. So, among other things,
regulations limit the investments banks can make and the capital they must
hold.
The previous example illustrated financial regulation based on
traditional economics and its assumption that bank depositors are rational.
Behavioral economics, on the other hand, has its roots in psychology. 14
Work in behavioral economics and behavioral finance demonstrates that
investors have limited cognitive abilities and numerous clear biases in the
way they process information and assess probabilities.15 Individuals, for
example, are overconfident about both their abilities and their knowledge.

14. Nizan G. Packin, It’s (Not) All About the Money: Using Behavioral Economics to
Improve Regulation of Risk Management in Financial Institutions, 15 U. PA. J. BUS. L., 419, 450
(2013).
15. Melissa A. Z. Knoll, The Role of Behavioral Economics and Behavioral Decision
Making in Americans’ Retirement Savings Decisions, 70 SOC. SEC. BULL., Nov. 2010 at 7.
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They are also affected by anchoring, a fact that is well known to skilled
negotiators.16 If negotiations to buy a car start at the sticker price, they are
anchored there and the final price will be higher than if negotiations start at
the price the dealership paid for the car. Framing, or how a decision is
presented, also affects individuals’ decisions. Equivalent choices described
in slightly different ways lead individuals to take different actions.
Behavioral researchers have also discovered biases in the way that
individuals assess probabilities. The likelihood of low probability events is
usually overestimated. Individuals ignore base rates. They are unable to
update probabilities correctly when new information is received. They
sometimes claim that both event A and event B occurring is more likely
than event A. Behavioral economics has been characterized as a “theory of
errors.”17
These findings are but a handful of the reasons why individuals can be
expected to make suboptimal decisions. Traditional economics says that
regulation is needed because markets fail under certain circumstances.
Behavioral economics says that regulation is needed because individuals
consistently fail to make good financial decisions.
So, behavioral economics suggests that protecting investors or other
financial decision makers is an important reason for regulation. Traditional
financial regulation has also tried to protect investors. To achieve this, the
SEC’s long-time approach has been to insure that companies release
complete and accurate information in a timely manner.18 Behavioral finance
would hold that this is not enough. Even with accurate and timely
information, investors make bad decisions. Instead, regulators can improve
welfare with paternalistic policies that force individuals to make specific
financial decisions.
Advantages and Disadvantages of Paternalism
Consider, for a moment, hard paternalism where regulators determine
what is best for individuals. There are some positive things to be said about
this approach to financial regulation. It may prevent some people from
making bad decisions. It may save individuals the time that it takes to
become informed about financial products that they would ultimately reject.
Many people have philosophical problems with paternalism. They see it
as a threat to liberty. They believe that controlling one’s own destiny, much
more than making correct financial decisions, is essential for happiness.
These are important issues, but we will not address them here. Instead, we

16. Timothy E. Lynch, Gambling by Another Name; The Challenge of Purely Speculative
Derivatives, 17 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN., 67, 90 (2011).
17. Joshua Wright & Douglas Ginsburg, Behavioral Law and Economics: its Origins, Fatal
Flaws and Implications for Liberty, 106 NW. U. L. REV., 1033, 1040 (2013).
18. 15 U.S.C. § 78q (2016).
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will discuss why paternalistic regulations that prevent individuals from
making some financial decisions or using some financial products may not
yield the best financial outcomes.
One problem is that regulators do not have all the information about
individuals’ situations that the individuals themselves possess. Individuals
make decisions based on the particulars of their current situation. A
financial product that may be inferior for most people on most occasions
may in fact be right for some individuals at some times. So, in some cases,
policy may attempt to correct seemingly irrational decisions that are, in fact,
rational when all of the facts of a person’s situation are known. It may also
place costly restrictions on rational people from policies designed to help
the irrational.19
A second problem is that regulators are afflicted with the same
psychological biases that plague everybody else. These biases may be
diminished by the regulators’ expertise and experience, or because the
regulator can be more objective in recommendations to others than people
can be when making their own decisions. On the other hand, people
overestimate their own competence and underestimate the competence of
others. Regulators are not immune to this bias. And people just love to tell
other people what to do. This suggests that regulators may not hesitate to
promote financial products that may not, in fact, be optimal for the
particular person or situation.
Another problem of paternalistic regulation is that it may discourage
innovation. Banks and other financial companies may be reluctant to create
new products that may not be approved by regulators or that might be
subject to a long approval process. They may also be reluctant to create
financial products that are useful for some people but may be misused by
others.
Finally, if paternalism pushes individuals into particular financial
products or services, it may prevent them from gathering information about
alternatives. At first blush, this seems like an advantage of paternalism.
After all, why should multiple people bear the cost of becoming informed
rather than a regulator bearing the cost once for everybody? But, people are
different and have different needs. Furthermore, they pass information on to
each other. One person’s choice to become informed may provide positive
externalities to many people.20
Some of these problems of paternalism can be overcome if regulators
allow individuals to make their own financial choices but “nudge” them
toward making what the regulators believe to be the best ones. Cass

19. Id. at 1049.
20. Bruce Ian Carlin, Simon Gervais & Gustavo Manso, Libertarian Paternalism,
Information Production, and Financial Decision Making, 26 REV. OF FIN. STUD. 2204, 2206 n.9
(2013).
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Sunstein, an advisor to the Obama Administration, and Richard Thaler, one
of the founders of behavioral economics, make the case for what they refer
to as “Libertarian Paternalism.”21 In their view, individuals can be “nudged”
toward making wise decisions while giving them the choice to opt out and
make other choices. An example would be the choice of contributions to
401(k) plans. Most plans allow employees to opt in to the plan, but Sunstein
and Thaler argue that they are more likely to make the correct choice of
contributing to a 401(k) plan if they have to actively choose to opt out.22
Sunstein and Thaler present a subtle argument for Libertarian
Paternalism. The way in which employers, investment advisors, or financial
institutions present choices has a strong effect on what individuals do
regardless of the actual information presented about the choices. Regulators
can nudge individuals to make good decisions by requiring certain “choice
architectures.” So, for example, making a choice a default choice will
increase the likelihood that individuals will choose it. Some choice
architecture must be used. Under these circumstances, why not make the
best choice the default?
Sunstein claims as a “first law of behaviorally informed regulation: In
the face of behavioral market failures, disclosure of information, warnings,
default rules, and other kinds of nudges are usually the best response, at
least when there is no harm to others.”23 While Sunstein is clearly a
proponent of paternalistic regulation, he recognizes objections to it. He
recognizes that many people feel autonomy is a desirable thing but claims
that most efforts to remedy “behavioral market failures” do not interfere
with autonomy, “rightly understood.”24 Hard paternalism is defined as
“actions by government that attempt to improve people’s own welfare by
imposing material costs on their choices.” Soft paternalism is “actions of
government that attempt to improve people’s own welfare by influencing
their choices without imposing material costs on those choices.”25 Sunstein
believes that soft paternalism, in the form of libertarian paternalism, can
preserve individuals’ autonomy while protecting them from their own
mistakes.
Smith and Zywicki, on the other hand, suggest that what is a gentle
nudge in theory, becomes a hard shove in practice.26 Regulators may find it
easier to force people into particular choices.

21. Cass R. Sunstein & Richard H. Thaler, Libertarian Paternalism is Not an Oxymoron, 70
U. OF CHI. L. REV. 1159, 1159 n.4 (2003).
22. Id.
23. Cass Sunstein, The Storrs Lectures: Behavioral Economics and Paternalism, 122 YALE
L.J. 1826, 1835 (2013).
24. Id. at 1837.
25. Id. at 1860.
26. Adam Smith & Todd Zywicki, Behavior, Paternalism and Policy: Evaluating Consumer
Financial Protection, 9 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 201, 211-12 (2015).
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In the last few years, libertarian paternalism has gained enormous
influence in Washington. In part, this is because libertarian paternalism has
been articulately defended in a number of well-cited academic papers. In
addition, proponents of this view have occupied prominent regulatory
positions. For example, Sunstein headed the Office of Information and
Regulatory Affairs in the Executive Office of the President.
REGULATORY TRENDS AND THE CFPB
The CFPB was established in the Dodd-Frank bill. Both of the trends
that we have discussed, regulator discretion rather than hard rules and
paternalism informed by behavioral economics, have been incorporated into
the CFPB’s approach to regulation since its beginning.27
“Making Credit Safer,” an article by Oren Bar-Gill and Elizabeth
Warren, is generally acknowledged to be the intellectual father of the
CFPB.28 It calls for the creation of a new regulatory agency with “broad
rulemaking and enforcement authority over consumer credit products.”29
The CFPB was always conceived of as an agency in which powerful
regulators had broad powers to determine acceptable financial products and
practices. Regulation of consumer finance, which had been spread across a
number of regulators, was to be concentrated here.
In arguing the need for an independent agency to regulate consumer
financial products, Bar-Gill and Warren rely on both traditional economic
arguments and arguments from behavioral economics. They observe that it
may be costly for consumers to become informed about financial products.
By itself, this is not a large problem. Consumers invest in information until
the expected benefit from investing more is offset by the cost. But Bar-Gill
and Warren also note that consumers are imperfectly rational. They may,
for example, forego information about credit card late fees in the mistaken
belief that they will never make a late payment.
The CFPB and Regulator Discretion
From the start, the CFPB was always envisioned as a regulator with
broad discretionary powers. The original Bar-Gill and Warren article notes
that “legislation targeted to specific practices . . . is incapable of effectively
responding to the high rate of innovation in consumer credit markets and
the subtle ways in which creditors can exploit consumer
misunderstanding.”30 In other words, individuals cannot be protected unless
27. CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION BUREAU, CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION
BUREAU OUTLINES BANK SUPERVISION APPROACH (2011),
http://www.consumerfinance.gov/newsroom/consumer-financial-protection-bureau-outlines-banksupervision-approach/.
28. Oren Bar-Gill & Elizabeth Warren, Making Credit Safer, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1 (2008).
29. Id. at 99.
30. Making Credit Safer, supra note 30, at 100.
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regulators have discretionary powers.
The CFPB has the power to regulate “unfair, deceptive, or abusive
product(s).”31 These vague, general terms give the CFPB the power to
regulate many things. The term abusive, in particular, can be used to give
broad discretionary powers to the CFPB. The terms unfair and deceptive
have history and precedents in regulation. Abusive is new. It will ultimately
be defined through enforcement actions that lead to court rulings. In the
meantime, the CFPB decides which policies or practices are abusive, and
can bring enforcement actions based on their judgment.
The CFPB interprets its broad mandate to include virtually any
financial practice that can be construed as detrimental to individuals. The
CFPB’s Education Loan Examination Procedures manual states that, “[t]o
carry out the objectives set forth in the Examination Objectives section, the
examination process also will include assessing other risks to consumers
that are not governed by specific statutory or regulatory provisions.”32
The broad discretion given to CFPB regulators to pursue their mandate
creates tremendous uncertainty for financial institutions.33 It is difficult to
know in advance which products and services will be deemed abusive and
which will be allowed. In some cases, it is likely that this uncertainty will
prevent financial firms from providing products or services that would be
useful to their customers.
An example of the CFPB’s regulatory discretion in action comes from
the CFPB’s attempt to regulate auto dealers.34 In drafting the Dodd-Frank
bill, Congress carved out auto dealers from the CFPB’s jurisdiction. There
are not good reasons for doing this. Auto loans represent a large portion of
consumer debt. But auto dealers lobbied effectively and the Dodd-Frank bill
clearly specifies that they are exempt from CFPB regulation.
So, the CFPB has sought to regulate auto dealers indirectly by
regulating lenders who work with auto dealers. When auto dealers arrange
financing for car buyers, they typically arrange for a loan from a bank and
then mark up the interest rate, so car buyers who arrange financing through
a dealer pay more than the rate charged by the lender. A concern for the
CFPB has been the interest rate markup charged by dealers above the
interest rate charged by the lender.
In March 2013, the agency released a bulletin that warned lenders that
they would be responsible if auto dealers discriminated on loan interest

31.
32.

12 U.S.C. §5536(a)(1)(B) (Supp. IV 2011).
CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION BUREAU EXAMINATION PROCEDURES,
EDUCATION LOANS 7 (Dec. 2013).
33. See Todd Zywicki, The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau: Savior or Menace?, 81
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 856 (2013).
34. Rachel Witkowski, The Inside Story of the CFPB’s Battle Over Auto Lending, AM.
BANKER (Sept. 24, 2015), http://www.americanbanker.com/news/law-regulation/the-inside-storyof-the-cfpbs-battle-over-auto-lending-1076940-1.html?zkPrintable=1&nopagination=1.
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rates on the basis of race.35 The race of the loan applicant is recorded on
mortgage forms but not on auto loan forms. Lenders do not know the race
of the loan applicant. Neither, for that matter, does the CFPB. They instead
rely on statistical models based on demographics to predict the applicant’s
race and use a disparate impact analysis to determine if minority borrowers
were being charged more for car loans. They have crafted a proxy method
based on demographics to determine the race of a borrower.
Here is where the use of discretion rather than rules comes into play.
Rather than issuing a rule so that lenders can avoid being charged with
discriminatory lending, the CFPB is considering some enforcement actions
against lenders. If a rule was issued they would have to make it publicly
available and their methodology would be described and subject to scrutiny.
In addition, the precarious legal basis for their enforcement would be
revealed. They are, after all, not supposed to regulate auto dealers.
Here, the costs of discretion are clear. Lenders are not given
information that allows them to structure their compliance to avoid
discrimination charges. This uncertainty makes them reluctant to loan
money. From the standpoint of the lender, the way to avoid legal action is
for the auto dealer to charge the same interest rate on each loan. That
appears to be the CFPB’s objective.
Giving regulators discretion always carries with it the possibility of
abuse. Mark Seidenfeld believes that in many cases, the advantages of
regulator discretion outweigh this risk as long as the regulator is subject to
ex-post review.36 The CFPB has been set up in such a way though that it is
subject to almost no political oversight. It is run by one director rather than
five commissioners like the SEC or Commodity Futures Trading
Commission (CFTC).37 It is housed in the Federal Reserve and is not
subject to congressional budgetary review.38 Its rulings can only be
overturned by a two-thirds vote of the FSOC, and only if the rule threatens
the financial stability of the United States.39
The CFPB and Paternalism
Behavioral economics has been baked into the CFPB from the
beginning. The foundational article by Oren Bar-Gill and Elizabeth Warren
speaks of the need to protect imperfectly rational consumers.40 Behavioral

35. CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION BUREAU, CFPB BULLETIN 2013-02 (2013),
http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201303_cfpb_march_-Auto-Finance-Bulletin.pdf.
36. Mark Seidenfeld, Bending the Rules: Flexible Regulation and Constraints on Agency
Discretion, 51 ADMIN. L. REV., 429, 432 (1999).
37. Adam Levitin, The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau: An Introduction, 32 REV.
BANKING & FIN. L. 321, 340 (2013).
38. Id. at 339.
39. Id. at 353.
40. Making Credit Safer, supra note 30, at 157.
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views are well represented at the CFPB.
The academic advisory board for the CFPB, which is composed of firstrate scholars, includes behavioralists Richard Thaler and Christine Jolls, a
coauthor of Sunstein and Thaler.41
Dodd-Frank authorizes the CFPB to prohibit abusive acts and
practices.42 A recent article by Patrick Corrigan contends that the abuse
authority gives the CFPB the power to regulate problems arising from
irrationality of the type documented by behavioral economics.43 The FTC
has long worked to prevent unfair and deceptive practices, but the term
abusive is new.44 It is not defined in the law, but section 1031(d) provides
minimum standards to the CFPB to apply the law.45 The CFPB can only
declare a product or service to be abusive if it:
(1)materially interferes with the ability of a consumer to understand
a term or condition of a consumer financial product or services; or
(2) takes unreasonable advantage of—(A) a lack of understanding
on the part of the consumer of the material risks, costs, or
conditions of the product or service; (B) the inability of the
consumer to protect the interests of the consumer in selecting or
using a consumer financial product or service; or (C) the reasonable
reliance by the consumer on a covered person to act in the interests
of the consumer.46
Inability to understand a product, or to protect one’s own interests is, of
course, a major concern of behavioral economics.
Many of the CFPB’s actions appear to be motivated by paternalism. For
example, the CFPB believes individuals have trouble understanding their
credit cards and seeks to make them more understandable. On their website,
the CFPB says, “A credit card agreement describes the structures and
features of a credit card. We believe that it is important to make them less
complicated so that consumers can better understand their credit cards.”
They propose a standardized two-page form.47
The CFPB also takes a paternalistic view of mortgages. Mortgages that

41. Christine Jolls, Cass Sunstein, & Richard Thaler, A Behavioral Approach to Law and
Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1545 (1998).
42. 12 U.S.C. § 5511 (b)(2).
43. Patrick M. Corrigan, “Abusive” Acts and Practices: Dodd-Frank’s Behaviorally
Informed Authority Over Consumer Credit Markets and Its Application to Teaser Rates, 18
N.Y.U. J. OF LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y, 125, 146 (2015).
44. Levitin, supra note 39, at 337.
45. 12 U.S.C. § 5531(d).
46. Id.
47. CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION BUREAU, CREDIT CARDS (2015),
http://www.consumerfinance.gov/credit-cards/ (last visited Nov. 11, 2015).
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meet certain standards are “qualified mortgages.”48 Qualifying a loan makes
it more difficult to hold the lender liable for failing to make a “reasonable,
good faith determination of a consumer’s ability to repay.”49 Hence from
the standpoint of lenders, a big advantage of writing qualified mortgages is
that it provides a safe harbor from some kinds of lawsuits. Restrictions on
mortgages that allow them to be deemed qualified mortgages include: 1) no
negative amortization or interest only payments, 2) no balloon payments, 3)
loan term of 30 years or less, 4) a 3% cap on fees and points, and 5) the
borrower’s debt-to-income (DTI) must be 43% or less.50
Here, the gentle nudge becomes a hard push. There are good reasons for
some borrowers to take out mortgages with these provisions. A 40-year
mortgage, for example, can reduce monthly payments to a level that allows
a borrower to easily make payments. A debt-to-income ratio greater than
43% may be acceptable for a borrower whose income is expected to
increase, or who has a lot of assets. The CFPB does not prevent borrowers
from taking out mortgages with these provisions, but since they are not
qualified mortgages, lenders will be more likely to be sued.
A second part of being a qualified mortgage is that the lender must
establish the borrower’s ability to repay. The CFPB’s ability-to-pay rule
went into affect in January 2014.51 Under this rule, for a mortgage to be
qualified, creditors must consider eight underwriting factors for a
residential mortgage loan to assess the borrower’s ability to repay the loan:
1) current or reasonably expected income or assets, 2) current employment
status, 3) the monthly payment on the mortgage, 4) the monthly payment on
other loans, 5) the monthly payment for mortgage-related obligations, 6)
current debt obligations, alimony, and child support, 7) the monthly debt-toincome ratio or residual income, and 8) credit history.52
It is hard to understand the logic behind an ability-to-pay rule. Perhaps
borrowers lack the mental capacity to determine whether they will be able
to make mortgage payments. Lenders, however, should be able to make that
determination. Banks do not make money by making loans that are not
repaid. They have every incentive to make sure loans are repaid.
Furthermore, they have experience and expertise in determining the

48. 12 C.F.R. § 1026.43(e)(2).
49. CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION BUREAU, WHAT IS A QUALIFIED MORTGAGE?
(2015), http://www.consumerfinance.gov/askcfpb/1789/what-qualified-mortgage.html.
50. How Prospective and Current Homeowners Will Be Harmed by the CFPB’s Qualified
Mortgage Rule: Before the H. Fin. Services Subcomm. on Financial Institutions and Consumer
Credit, 113th Cong. 5 (2014) (statement of Daniel Weickenand, CEO, Orion Federal Credit
Union).
51. CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION BUREAU, ABILITY TO REPAY AND QUALIFIED
MORTGAGE STANDARDS UNDER THE TRUTH IN LENDING ACT (REGULATION Z) (2013),
http://www.consumerfinance.gov/regulations/ability-to-repay-and-qualified-mortgage-standardsunder-the-truth-in-lending-act-regulation-z/.
52. 12 C.F.R. § 1026.43(c)(2).
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likelihood that loans will be repaid. So, the ability-to-pay rule seems likely
to create extra paperwork and an extra regulatory burden on lenders. It may
also prevent banks from making loans to customers who they expect to be
able to repay but do not meet the one-size-fits-all criteria established by the
CFPB.
THE CFPB AND CONSUMER BANKING
Even without its paternalism and its regulatory discretion, the CFPB
can be expected to impose significant costs on the banking sector. Financial
firms with total assets of more than $10 billion will undergo annual
examinations by the CFPB. Version 2 of the CFPB Examination manual
(October, 2012) is 924 pages long.53 There are a number of other manuals
covering specific aspects of the examination. Financial institutions with less
than $10 billion in assets are exempt from examination, but not from other
rules. Among other things, they, like larger institutions, are subject to
Section 1026 of Dodd-Frank which authorizes the CFPB to ‘require
reports . . . as necessary’ to support its mission.54
The CFPB’s regulation by discretion rather than rules is likely to
impose additional costs on the banking sector. Recently, Jim Purcell,
President of the State National Bank of Big Spring Texas complained,
Dodd-Frank imposes immense regulatory costs upon community
banks, costs that are exacerbated by the CFPB’s persistently,
inherently regulatory uncertainty.” “As the CFPB’s own web site
shows, its rulemakings are the subject of constant significant
revision – and that’s when the CFPB bothers with express
rulemakings at all, instead of regulating informally through caseby-case ‘guidance’ and enforcement proceedings.55
Finally, the CFPB’s paternalistic approach to regulation will make it
harder for financial institutions to offer nonstandard or complex financial
products. Marsh and Norman contend that,
A recurring theme in Dodd-Frank, particularly with respect to the
53. CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION BUREAU, SUPERVISION AND EXAMINATION
MANUAL, VERSION 2 (Oct. 2012), http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201210_cfpb_supervisionand-examination-manual-v2.pdf
54. Tanya D. Marsh & Joseph W. Norman, The Impact of Dodd-Frank on Community
Banks, AM. ENTERPRISE INST. (May 7, 2013), www.aei.org/publication/the-impact-of-dodd-frankon-community-banks/#.
55. Michael Tremoglie, Dodd-Frank’s Unintended Consequences – Wall Street Reaps
Benefits of D.C. Regulation, MAINSTREET (Feb. 26, 2015),
https://www.mainstreet.com/article/dodd-franks-unintended-consequences—wall-street-reapsbenefits-of-dc-regulation.
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Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, is that standardization of
financial products and forms will protect consumers. This is
implicitly a reaction to the narrative that one of the causes of the
financial crisis was the inability of parties to understand and
appreciate the risks of innovative financial products. But the focus
on standardization of consumer financial products, like home loans
and checking accounts, fails to recognize the value to consumers of
the community banking model, which emphasizes relationship
banking, personalized underwriting, and customization of financial
products to meet the specific needs of customers and
communities.56
Yogi Berra is alleged to have said, “Prediction is difficult. Especially
when it concerns the future.”57 The CFPB is relatively new and its impact
on the financial sector is difficult to predict. It may well be successful in
reducing the frequency of poor financial decisions by consumers. But that
will come at a cost. Its paternalism and its discretionary enforcement is
likely to eliminate financial product and services that are useful and
appropriate for some individuals. It is likely to slow financial innovation. It
will also impose large compliance costs on banks and other financial
institutions, costs that smaller institutions may find difficult to bear.

56. Witkowski, supra note 36, at 39.
57. Esomar, “It’s Hard to Make Predictions, Especially About The Future”, RW Connect
(June 10, 2014) https://rwconnect.esomar.org/its-hard-to-make-predictions-especially-about-thefuture/

